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INTRODUCTION
One cannot open a newspaper today without reading about the
formation of a new trading consortium or market. Electronic
technology makes it increasingly easy to develop both local niche and
broad-based international markets.1 Electronic technology readily
and cheaply spans geographic boundaries, cultures, and time zones.
Markets using such technology can—and do—deliver the power of
immediate information and direct trading access into the hands of
customers, wherever they are located. Many functions, such as loans,
insurance, and utility rates, as well as many property interests, such as
emissions, bandwidth, or air rights, have been securitized or
commoditized so that they can be more efficiently priced in a central
marketplace.2 Centering demand is easy electronically. In principle,
most financial activity now can occur on markets. Some have called
this phenomenon a capital markets revolution.3
1. At least in the United States, securities regulators have made it easier, as well,
by permitting alternative trading systems (“ATS”) to organize as broker-dealers
under specified conditions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16 (1999); Regulation of
Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844 (1998) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 202, 240, 242, 249) (changing the definition of “exchange” in Rule 3b16 to “give securities markets a choice to register as exchanges, or to register as
broker-dealers and comply with Regulation ATS”), corrected by 64 Fed. Reg. 13,065
(1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 19,450 (1999) (furnishing, retrospectively, technical
amendments to final rule); A New Regulatory Framework, Report of the Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission
Staff
Task
Force
(Feb.
22,
2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/reports.htm> (stating a proposal for exempting certain
electronic multi-lateral transaction execution facilities from application of the
Commodity Exchange Act and providing for two streamlined market designation
categories—“recognized derivatives transaction facility” and “recognized futures
exchange,” which, when fully implemented into Commission rules, may materially
reduce the costs of regulatory compliance for certain proposed electronic markets);
see also CFTC Releases Proposal on New Regulatory Framework, No. 4405-00 (June 8,
2000) (visited June 12, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/regulatory.htm>.
2. See PATRICK YOUNG & THOMAS THEYS, CAPITAL MARKET REVOLUTION: THE
FUTURE OF MARKETS IN AN ONLINE WORLD 1-22 (1999) (discussing innovations made
possible by electronic technology).
3. See id. Although electronic markets have advantages with respect to spanning
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The premise of this Article is that so long as property and
contractual rights are protected by, and enforceable in, the pertinent
legal systems, markets in general, and electronic markets in
particular, can in principle be the perfect international trading
vehicles. Theoretically, the contractual nature of market conventions
can permit a third world system to have a first world market
infrastructure.4 Theoretically, technology can export a first world
market around the globe in real time to wherever trading demand is
located.
Why is this premise important to industries such as energy, to
political initiatives such as improving the quality of the global
environment, to brokers and dealers who want to access multiple
products and jurisdictions from a single platform, and to financial
markets regulators coping with adapting national regulatory systems
to an international marketplace? Because, while national legislatures
struggle to keep pace with technological change, and international
organizations of financial services regulators labor to produce crossborder minimum standards and guidance on best practices,
electronic derivatives markets have the free market incentives and the
resources to harmonize jurisdictional differences right now.
This Article outlines the structural characteristics of markets that
enable them to transcend national law. It then discusses three
examples of current initiatives seeking to use these characteristics to
the best advantage: (1) the London Clearing House Limited’s
SwapClear program for registering and clearing certain privately

jurisdictions and time zones and automating trading rules and conventions, there
may remain issues regarding how such markets can (1) provide liquidity as volume
increases or decreases, (2) address large orders, (3) secure proprietary (private)
information, (4) respond to capacity or response time constraints, (5) provide for
the handling of errors, and (6) assure system integrity generally. This Article does
not address these issues. It also does not address whether the advent of electronic
markets will lead to the organization of broad, integrated markets, or cause
fragmentation or undesirable disintermediation. To the extent that there are
additional or different issues of concern in equity securities markets, this Article does
not address those issues. Rather, this Article focuses on the capacity of electronic
derivatives markets by contract to facilitate market access across borders generally,
whether to broad-based or local niche markets. International alliances established by
contract to engage in trade or to provide financial services are not new. Consider,
for example, the Hanseatic League and the Wendish Monetary Union. See generally
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 44 (2d ed.
1993).
4. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining that market regulations
can be determined by contract). From a competitive perspective, this is both the
“good news” and the “bad news” in that technology, by reducing the cost of
competition, potentially expands both the range and the quality of the international
competition for any given market.
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negotiated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives transactions;5
(2) BrokerTec Global, LLC’s proposal for the development of a
twenty-four hour single electronic facility or platform for execution,
and potentially, the related clearing of international fixed-income
cash and listed futures and options products;6 and (3) the Kyoto
Protocol, which includes provisions to permit the trading of
internationally-recognized greenhouse gas emission allowances.7 This
Article concludes that, with transparent rules in a legal system that
protects and enforces property and contractual rights, and with fair
governance (of the market8 and legal systems accessed), markets can
improve on and harmonize national law by applying uniform rules to
their participants. As a consequence, the development of markets
that can deliver internationally efficient prices and risk shifting or
management tools with legal certainty is very promising.9
I.

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKETS AND THE POWER OF
THE EXCHANGE CONTRACT TO ENHANCE LEGAL CERTAINTY

Legal certainty and the efficiency of markets are a beneficial byproduct of their structure.10 In essence, markets sell their rules as
well as their trading (execution and prices) systems and back office
5. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Release No. 4247-99 (Mar. 23,
1999), available at CFTC, Release #4247-99 (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cftc.
gov/opa/press99/4247-99.htm> [hereinafter CFTC Release 4247-99] (finding that
OTC transactions cleared on SwapClear do not lose their exempt status under the
Commodity Exchange Act and related rules and describing various programs for
registering and clearing certain privately negotiated over-the-counter derivatives
transactions).
6. See Statement by BrokerTec Global, LLC, on Objectives for Listed Derivatives
(July 13, 1999) (on file with American University Law Review). This statement was
circulated privately to various exchanges and other interested parties. In this
statement, BrokerTec noted that fair governance and equitable access are necessary
attributes for a market to prosper. BrokerTec Futures Exchange (BTEX), an affiliate
of BrokerTec Global, filed an application for designation as a contract market with
the CFTC on May 8, 2000. See Fed. Reg. 36,667 (June 9, 2000) (applying for
designation in U.S. Treasury Note and U.S. Treasury Bond Futures).
7. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Control (visited June 7,
2000) <http://www.unfccc.org>.
8. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),
Principles of Corporate Governance (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
governance/principles.htm> (listing a set of non-binding principles for corporate
governance in OECD member countries).
9. See THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON COMMODITY RISK
MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEALING WITH COMMODITY PRICE VOLATILITY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A MARKET-BASED APPROACH (Sept. 1999)
[hereinafter THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE ON COMMODITY RISK
MANAGEMENT].
10. See Andrea M. Corcoran, Developing Exchange Derivatives Markets (Oct. 20,
1999) (Presentation given at the 1999 International Institute for Securities Market
Development) (transparencies on file at the CFTC).
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(clearing, settlement, and accounting) arrangements as part of their
product.11 Market rules define participants’ contract with the market
and ordinarily deal with:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

who may trade;
what and how they may trade;
when and how much of the unit of trading can be traded;
how the product is delivered or settled;
the consequences of failures to meet trading commitments or
otherwise abide by the rules of the game; and
12
(6) built-in surveillance and crisis management procedures.

Therefore, markets—through their rulemaking powers—have the
means to transcend or improve upon national law. In particular, as
discussed more fully below, they can provide:
(1) common trading rules that are implemented without regard to
the identity of the players or where they are located;
(2) equitable cross-border access to transparent prices, and;
(3) secure settlement of transactions or delivery to participants
13
located in multiple jurisdictions.
11. See id. The benefits for multilateral arrangements attributed to market rules
that define trading and back office systems are attributes of open-outcry markets as
well as electronic markets. This Article, however, focuses specifically on electronic
markets.
12. Id.
13. The Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) Rules for Project A, its electronic
system, state that:
The rules and regulations contained in this Chapter govern those Exchange
contracts which are traded through the Project A system. To the extent that
the provisions in this Chapter conflict with rules and regulations in other
sections of the Rulebook, this Chapter supersedes such rules and regulations
and governs the manner in which contracts are traded through the Project A
system. Otherwise, contracts traded on the Project A system are fully subject
to applicable general rules and regulations of the Association unless
specifically and expressly excluded therefrom.
CBOT Rule 9B.01. The CBOT membership application reads, in pertinent part: “I
do hereby agree that, if I am accepted as a member of the Association, I will observe
and be bound by the Charter, Rules and Regulations of the Association, and all the
amendments thereto.”
See Chicago Board of Trade, Membership Agreement.
FutureCom, an internet-based exchange provides in its account agreement at XIIIB:
“Orders will be matched according to time price priority rules. Orders at the same
price will be executed according to the first order placed in time. Orders with a
price limit will be executed according to rules that fill the best price first.” The
account agreement thus states the rules contained in the algorithm. The FutureCom
account agreement will be signed electronically and may also be signed manually to
the extent required by relevant local law. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(“CME”) Rule 570 states that the rules of the CME apply to Globex (its electronic
system). See CME Rule 570. Terminal operators using Globex must agree to be
bound by the rules of the CME. See CME Terminal Operator Identification (on file with
American University Law Review) (required of operators seeking user IDs). The Cantor
Financial Futures Exchange (CFFE), Non-US Member Trader Application and
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This is true notwithstanding a diversity of, or even diminished, legal
and regulatory infrastructures in some of the jurisdictions where
market counterparties are located.14
Although recognizing the critical importance of developing or
revamping capital market legislative regimes to address the
operations of an increasingly global marketplace, regulators cannot
ignore that comprehensive regulatory change takes time.15 For
regulators, a promising feature of evolving market structures is that,
pending regulatory change, an enforceable self-regulatory
infrastructure can be pursued by contract.16 The optimistic view is
Clearing Member Guarantee provides that “Clearing Member and each Trader
hereby agree to be bound by the By-Laws and Rules and to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Exchange, the New York Cotton Exchange (including any
successor thereto [the New York Board of Trade]) and the New York Clearing
Corporation, as applicable.” See CFFE, Non-U.S. Trader Application and Clearing
Membership Guaranty. The CFFE is wholly owned by the New York Board of Trade.
14. See, e.g., Exchange-Traded Derivatives in Developing Capital Markets Report
(1999)<http://www.cftc.gov/oia/interpro.htm/InternationalPublications>
(describing the law, exchanges, and economic status of 24 jurisdictions).
15. For example, the 1989 reauthorization of the CFTC culminated in the
Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 (1992 Act). See Futures Trading Practices Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 1(a), 106 Stat. 3590. The 1992 Act introduced several
kinds of increased flexibility. The Act added Section 4c (7 U.S.C. § 6(c)), an
exemptive provision that permits disapplication of the Commodity Exchange Act,
with certain exceptions, where marketplace changes would warrant such
disapplication. The related Conference Report directed the CFTC to use its Section
4c authority to address exempting “swaps” and “hybrids” among other things from
the exchange trading requirement of the CEA. The 1992 Act also expanded relief
with respect to exempt transactions from state anti-wagering laws (section 8(e), 7
U.S.C. § 12(e)), enhanced CFTC capacity to provide assistance to foreign
jurisdictions (section 12(f), 7 U.S.C. § 16(8)), enhanced the ability to protect the
confidentiality of information received from foreign authorities; and encouraged the
development of electronic markets globally (section 12(g), 7 U.S.C. § 16(g)). It also
added sections on exchange governance, conflicts of interest, new licensing
requirements, additional sanctions, and mandated that the Commission commence
multiple rulemakings. Similarly, the European Commission noted in a recent
communication that the European Union’s (“EU”) single market in financial services
had been under construction since 1973, and that it took over a decade for the EU
member states to agree upon legislation to implement the philosophy of “single
passport/home-country control.” See Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for
Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232, 11.05.99, pp. 1, 16; see also CFTC,
Regulation of Over-The-Counter Derivatives Transactions, Mar. 1999, at 73-81
<http://www.cftc.gov/oia/interpro.htm#> [hereinafter OTC Survey] (giving, in the
section on “Recent and Contemplated Changes,” other examples of the time frame
of major legislative initiatives in the financial services field). Compare Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, OTC Derivative Markets and Their Regulation, (Oct.
1993), with President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act (Nov. 1999). Notwithstanding the
difficulties incident to the process of regulatory reform, however, international
financial services regulators have identified as a priority the development of common
principles and standards in the operation of regulated markets. See Technical
Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”),
infra notes 17 and 50.
16. See HANS VAN HOUTTE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE § 1.24-1.30 (1995)
(discussing methods and applications for choice of law rules); see also RESTATEMENT
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that although pending change often gets embroiled in the political
process or in contentious battles among competitors, market-based
solutions to international public policy problems or commercial
needs nonetheless can go forward.17
Most importantly, their
implementation can be accomplished in a manner that is consistent
with the view that an appropriate infrastructure is vital to wellfunctioning markets.
A. The Multilateral Exchange Contract and the Rules of the Game
How can this be possible? A few examples are illustrative. Markets
live and die by their operating rules. Regardless of who enacts the
requirements, markets must have rules to function. These are often
called “the rules of the game.” As such, exchange rules potentially
can overcome uncertainties—not the least of which are non-existent,
conflicting, or inadequate laws. In some ways, exchanges are minigovernments or self-governments18—so a fair governance structure is
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187-188 (1971) (discussing validity and
enforceability of choice of law provisions). International private law rules in most
jurisdictions allow contracting parties to choose the law that will govern their
relationship, provided that the laws of the country chosen do not violate either
(1) the fundamental policy, mandatory laws, or ordre publique of the country whose
law would have applied in the absence of a choice of law provision, or (2) the
fundamental policy, mandatory laws, or ordre publique of the country of the court
seized of the case, in either of which event the court may determine not to apply the
laws of the country chosen in the contract. See generally Hiram E. Chodosh, An
Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction Between Treaty and Customary
Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 973 (1995); cf. infra note 24 and accompanying text
(noting the ability of clearing organizations and markets to operate by rules agreed
to on a multilateral basis).
17. Markets operate within a regulatory framework which, although not
harmonized internationally because of historical, legal, cultural, and juridical
differences, nonetheless ordinarily provides for accountability to the regulator and
arrangements for policing market rules that meet the regulatory objectives of
investor protection, fair, efficient and transparent markets, and reduction of systemic
risk. See IOSCO Technical Committee, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
(Sept. 1998) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998objectives.html>.
18. At least in certain countries, self-regulation for markets (like internal controls
and risk management for firms) is a required element of the regulatory structure.
See, e.g., General Regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 1.511.52 (1999) (establishing the requirement that exchanges, i.e., contract markets,
maintain affirmative programs to enforce their own rules and to oversee their
markets, and establish criteria for a self-regulatory organization adoption and
surveillance of the minimum financial requirements applied to such organizations’
members, respectively). Indeed, international standard-setters such as the Council of
Securities Regulators of the Americas (“COSRA”) and IOSCO have endorsed the
concept of self-regulation subject to appropriate oversight. See COSRA, Resolution
Concerning Principles of Effective Market Oversight, at Principles 3 and 4 (May 30, 1995)
(visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/cosra/r-over-e.asp>
(setting forth mechanisms for “maintaining an effective system for enforcing laws,
regulations, and self-regulatory organization rules governing the operation of . . .
markets”); see also IOSCO Technical Committee, Objectives and Principles of Securities
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critical to their proper function.19
Regulation, at Principles 6 and 7 (Sept. 1998) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.
iosco.org/docs-public/1998-objectives.html> (noting that core objectives of securities
regulation are the protection of investors, the assurance that markets are fair,
efficient and transparent, and the reduction of systemic risk).
Even though the movement toward for-profit markets is testing the limits of the
self-regulatory model, it is still an expected feature of market regulation and of
required risk management practices that exchanges will enforce their rules and
provide for orderly trading in an equitable manner. It is also still a feature of best
practice that these compliance activities of markets would be subject to oversight or
scrutiny by a regulatory authority. Exchanges have demutualized and become forprofit enterprises in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Italy, the U.K., and
Australia. See, e.g., London International Financial Futures Exchange, Corporate
Structure (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.liffe.com/ about/structure/index.htm>;
Australian Stock Exchange, The Australian Stock Exchange (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.asx.com.au/B1100.htm>.
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, and the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange Limited issued a joint press release on July 30, 1999, regarding the
conclusion of negotiations for a merger of the exchanges, with the surviving
exchange to be a for-profit company. On March 6, 2000, the Hong Kong Exchanges
issued a further press release that such merger had been completed. See Hong Kong
Futures Exchange, Inc., Hong Kong Futures Exchange becomes a subsidiary of Hong Kong
Exchanges and Clearing Limited (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.hkfe.com/news/
index.html>. The New York Stock Exchange also has announced recently that it
proposes to demutualize and to convert to a for-profit exchange. See Grep Ip, Big
Board May Go Public by November, But Tax Issues Could Become an Obstacle, WALL ST. J.,
July 26, 1999, at C1 (discussing the New York Stock Exchange’s proposed, but not yet
implemented, conversion from a membership-owned entity to for-profit public
company). In the case of for-profit markets, it may be that certain aspects of
enforcement will be (or will be required to be) outsourced or unbundled from the
marketplace itself or overseen by independent auditors or undertaken directly by the
regulator to limit the potential for conflicts of interest or to render such activities
cost efficient. For example, the National Futures Association, a U.S. self-regulatory
organization, which is a registered futures association with statutory responsibilities
under section 17 of the Commodity Exchange Act, indicates that several proposed
new markets have requested that it perform their compliance and surveillance
requirements. See Application of Merchant’s Exchange of St. Louis, LLC for
Designation as a Contract Market in Illinois Waterway and St. Louis Harbor Barge
Futures Contracts, 65 Fed. Reg. 4805 (2000) (publishing notice of availability of the
terms and conditions of proposed commodity futures contracts). Nevertheless, the
market will continue to operate by rule, multilateral contract, and in the case of
electronic markets, by algorithm, and will remain accountable to the regulator (and
its participants) for the enforcement of its operating rules and the integrity of
transactions conducted thereon. IOSCO’s Consultative Committee has an ongoing
project looking into this precise issue relating to new models for effective selfregulation. See Final Communiqué of the 23rd Annual Conference of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://www.iosco.org/
iosco.html>; see also Final Communiqué of the 25th Annual Conference of IOSCO “Global
Markets,
Global
Regulation”
(May
2000)
(visited
May
24,
2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html> [hereinafter 25th Communiqué]. At IOSCO’s
March 1999, meeting of its Technical Committee in Berlin, a Task Force was
constituted to identify issues, such as responsibility for enforcement of exchange
rules, related to demutualization. See 25th Communiqué supra; see also IOSCO
Consultative Committee’s Report, Model for Effective Self-Regulation (May 4, 2000) (on file
with American University Law Review) (stating that “SROs are effective in dealing with
global issues because self-regulation is defined by contract—the rule book—versus
national legislative acts”).
19. Cf. Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development (“OECD”),
Principles of Corporate Governance (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
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1.

Certainty and uniformity
Commercial incentives favor fairness, especially if they are
buttressed by required accountability to or oversight by a regulator.
Fairness is necessary for the market to function properly. It promotes
market confidence; market confidence supports liquidity; liquidity
promotes efficient pricing; efficient pricing enhances market
confidence and, in turn, attracts further liquidity. Fairness is also
cost-effective. On markets, one set of rules generally applies across
the board to all similarly situated market participants. In electronic
systems, the algorithm that matches orders or trades constitutes the
trading and execution rules that govern the priority and manner of
trading. This leaves no room for disputes as to the applicability of the
trading rules contained in the system. The rules also standardize the
interest traded. This eliminates disputes about the validity of, or
uncertainty as to the legality of, that interest.20
As the algorithm enforces the trading rules, assuming the
algorithm cannot be gamed or compromised, the system itself will
assure uniform treatment in accordance with its matching and
priority rules to all participants, and will provide a complete audit
trail that cannot be circumvented.21
2.

Certainty, transparency, and equitable application of the rules
All trading on the system can be made visible in real time to
compliance personnel.
Therefore, ongoing surveillance and
reconstruction of trading is possible.
Similarly, such trading
potentially can be made transparent to the public in real time and
wherever located, thereby reinforcing efficient pricing. Most systems
include their own dispute resolution, disciplinary and emergency
rules, error resolution procedures, and liability limitations, which
each participant using the system subscribes or consents to by
entering into an access arrangement or by becoming a member.
These rules also govern the execution of trades.22
governance/principles.pdf> (containing a set of non-binding principles that are
intended to assist OECD member countries in their efforts to “evaluate and improve
the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance . . .”). See,
e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(a)(17)(A), 7a(c)(15)(A), 19 (1994).
20. See Andrea M. Corcoran, Prudential Regulation of OTC Derivatives: Lessons from
the Exchange-Traded Sector, in PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS AND SECURITIES FIRMS
(G. Ferrarini ed., 1995).
21. See Andrea M. Corcoran & John C. Lawton, Regulatory Oversight and Automated
Trading Design: Elements of Consideration, 13 J. FUTURES MARKETS 213, 217-18 (1993)
(explaining that the nature of the algorithm can prevent trading abuses).
22. Compare IOSCO Technical Committee, Principles for the Oversight of Screen-Based
Trading Systems, at Documents Library, (June 1990) (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html> (establishing standards for regulatory authorities
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3.

Certainty and market integrity
Exchange rules also govern the integrity of the transaction.
Membership, eligibility, or access criteria are set to limit who can use
or have direct access to the market (i.e., to filter out the unfit, the
under-capitalized, or the improvident and to restrain trading within
appropriate limits). Derivatives exchanges tend to collect obligations
owed to them up front. Typically, they are pay-as-you-go systems that
are intended to remove credit risk from the market or reduce it to
the bare minimum on at least a daily basis.23 Back-office (accounting
for trades, positions, and financial results) and settlement functions
also can in effect be built into the individual interests traded, the
market’s rules and the system, whether they are actually integrated
into the market itself or linked to it through separate clearing
facilities. As a consequence, multilateral netting of obligations can be
made automatic and a part of market rules either through the market
itself or through its clearing arrangements. Typically, the “market” or
the relevant clearing system is a central counterparty which becomes
the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.24 This feature is
responsible for oversight of screen-based trading systems for derivative products)
(the principles are listed in the Appendix of this Article), with IOSCO Technical
Committee, Issues in the Regulation of Cross-Border Proprietary Screen-Based Trading
Systems (Oct. 1994) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1994issues_in_regulation of_cross-border.html> (identifying range of issues relevant to
regulation of Proprietary Trading Systems (“PTS”)). See, e.g., IOSCO Technical
Committee, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, at Principles 25-30 and section
13 (Sept. 1998) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998objectives.html> (asserting that trading systems should be subject to “regulatory
authorization and oversight” to “promote transparency of trading” and to “detect and
deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices”).
23. See Andrea M. Corcoran, Developing Financial and Operational Performance
Standards for Exchange Derivatives Markets: A Modest Proposal for an International
Dialogue, 4 EUROPEAN FIN. SERVICES L. 145 (May/June 1997) (setting forth key
components of assuring transaction integrity). Real-time gross settlement of
obligations is one ideal—and an achievable ideal by the use of electronic systems—
reducing the time exposure or credit risk of unsettled obligations to the legal risk of
disparate national laws.
24. Generally, for a futures exchange’s clearing organization, trading is a zerosum game: The gains of the winners equal the losses of the losers. Gains and losses
are matched and settled daily. In addition to netting cash flows efficiently, the
clearing organization’s taking of the opposite side of each trade and becoming the
common counterparty for all traders results in another advantage. Such a
counterparty relieves traders of the necessity to assess the financial condition of their
actual counterparties in the market and thereby permits and facilitates anonymous
transacting. However, market counterparties handling customer business must still
assess their credit risk vis-à-vis their customers and customers must still assess the
credit of any intermediary through whom they transact. Also, it is possible to
unbundle the trade execution and clearing functions of an exchange and to clear
transactions that are consummated over-the-counter or at another exchange through
a clearing account. Clearing organizations, like markets, operate by rules agreed to
on a multilateral basis by their members or participants. See, for example, Article V
Section 3, “Conditions to Admission,” of the Options Clearing Corporation, which
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intended to leave no room for speculation as to what is valid or
invalid netting or what is valid or invalid collateral for purposes of
determining an individual market participant’s exposures to its
counterparties and to the market. This system also eliminates the
need to return to the original, actual counterparty to a transaction to
reverse or offset that transaction, and as a consequence, this system
reduces asset liquidity risk and transaction costs.25 Over-the-counter
derivatives counterparties, and associations of OTC derivatives
dealers, attempt to obtain the same result by standardizing master
agreements and by choosing the law of, or advocating the choice of
the law of, a particular jurisdiction to govern their contracts.26
4.

Certainty in the event of default
An exchange’s rules also address market failures and the failure of
market participants to perform.27 Exchange rules typically permit
states that:
No applicant shall be admitted as a Clearing Member until the applicant . . .
has signed and delivered to the Corporation an agreement . . . . (b) to abide
by all provisions of the By-Laws and the Rules and by all procedures adopted
pursuant thereto, (c) that the By-Laws and the Rules shall be a part of the
terms and conditions of every Exchange transaction or other contract or
transaction which the applicant, while a Clearing Member, may make or
have with the Corporation, or with other Clearing Members in respect of
cleared securities or market baskets, or which may be cleared or required to
be cleared through the Corporation.
Id. It specifically indicates that such members must, in the case of Non-US Securities
Firms:
(i) comply . . . with the guidelines and restrictions imposed on domestic
broker-dealers regarding the extension of credit as provided by Section 7 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation T . . . with respect to any
customer account that includes cleared securities issued by the
Corporation . . . and (k) to consent . . . to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts
and to the application of United States law in connection with any dispute
with the Corporation arising from membership.
Id. The Clearing Member Agreement of the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation
(that clears for the Chicago Board of Trade) provides: “The undersigned, while a
clearing member, will abide by the Charter, Bylaws, rules, procedures and policies of
the Clearing Corporation and all amendments and modifications thereto which may
be adopted from time to time.” See Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, Clearing
Member Agreement (on file with American University Law Review); see also supra note 21.
This Article does not explicitly address issues relevant to clearing organizations that
seek to cross borders independent of markets.
25. See Corcoran, supra note 20; see also infra note 61 (discussing the London
Clearing House’s SwapClear program, used to clear over-the-counter transactions).
26. See, e.g., International Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.isda.org> (describing the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association’s (“ISDA”) standardized documentation, netting opinion, and collateral
enforcement projects); see also, e.g., Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
and the Euro-currency Standing Committee, Bank for International Settlements,
Report on OTC Derivatives: Settlement Procedures and Counterparty Risk Management (Sept.
1998) <http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>.
27. Cf. Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in
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open interest to be liquidated immediately, and subject margin and
other collateral or security to the payment of the markets’ claims
against a defaulting party.28 The national law of some jurisdictions
explicitly permits disposition of such property in accordance with
exchange rules.29 Such exchange rules may include the value of a
defaulting member’s memberships or access arrangements in the
property available to satisfy the claims of other exchange members
against the defaulting member.
Exchange rules should be
enforceable by the market notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the
clearing member.30 Therefore, the property value of open interest,
collateral, exchange memberships, or access arrangements may be
accessible by the exchange to satisfy specified claims of its members
(or contracting participants) and, in the event of a default, may be
disbursed, liquidated, or transferred in accordance with exchange
rules with a minimum of delay and interference from the courts.31

Futures Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers from Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 849, 851 (1987) (“[E]xamining one broker’s failure . . . as an illustration
of certain customer and market protection problems [that] can be engendered by a
commodity broker’s failure, assess[ing] current regulatory protections against such
problems, and suggest[ing] potential improvements to the system.”).
28. See id. at 849 (discussing scope of practices permitted by exchange rules).
29. See IOSCO, Report on International Regulation of Derivatives Markets, Products and
Financial Intermediaries: Common Framework of Analysis and Cross-Regulatory Summary
Chart, at 236-41 (1997), available at <http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html>; see also
European Union Council Directive 98/26/EC, Official Journal L166/45 (June 11,
1998) [hereinafter Settlement Finality Directive] (discussing settlement finality in
payment and securities settlement systems).
30. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 8, 15 (1924) (finding that a
seat on an exchange owned by a bankrupt member passed, subject to the rules of the
exchange, to the bankrupt’s trustee in bankruptcy. The exchange rules provided
that other exchange members to whom the bankrupt member owed exchange
obligations could object to sale of the bankrupt member’s seat as such members had
a prior claim to the proceeds of any sale); CFTC Bankruptcy Rules, 17 C.F.R. pt. 190
(1999) (regulating, inter alia, the effect of bankruptcy proceedings on debtor’s estate,
commodity contracts, transfers, calculation of allowed net equity, allocation of
property, and allowance of claims); In re Drexel Burham Lambert Group Inc., 120
B.R. 724, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (deducing that where transactions involving the
“purchase or sale of commodities . . . would appear to fall within the general
competence of judges . . . there is plain merit in having [the Chicago Board of
Trade] determine all of the . . . issues bearing on validity and amount of the
Member’s claims . . . relating to the liquidation of the Members’ claims”); see also
Settlement Finality Directive, supra note 29, at art. 7 (“Insolvency proceedings shall
not have retroactive effects on the rights and obligations of a participant arising
from, or in connection with, its participation in a system earlier than the moment of
its opening such proceedings . . . .”).
31. See Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) and supra note 30. For
examples in specific countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom), see OTC Survey, supra note 15, at 69-70. In some jurisdictions, these rules
also apply to documented OTC transactions. See also 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1994)
(explaining rights of U.S. domiciled derivatives clearing organization in bankruptcy).
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5.

Certainty and consent to the rules of the game
The consent of members (trading rights holders and/or market
participants) to the rule structure of the market permits the
exchange or clearing structure to enforce multilateral commitments
of such participants to support the financial conclusion of
transactions conducted on the market.32 Such consent also can
overcome issues related to:
(1) what information has to be provided to the exchange by market
participants;
(2) the use of information in the system by system supervisors or
operators;
(3) the sharing of appropriate information with regulators or
33
authorities in other jurisdictions; and
(4) the resolution of disputes about executions, handling of errors,
and liability for system failures.

In the case of electronic systems, the system itself can document
this contract to abide by the rules of the game by making it part of
the conclusion or execution of a transaction; that is, consent occurs
by making it the assumed pre-condition of each and every trade. In
many jurisdictions, the terms and conditions of standardized
exchange contracts are themselves part of the exchange’s operating
rules, thereby reinforcing that the terms of the contracts are legal
and enforceable.34
32. Such commitments also may be supported by disapplication of local antitrust
laws. See 7 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (requiring CFTC to consider that the public interest is
protected by antitrust laws and “to endeavor to take the least anti-competitive means
of achieving” statutory objectives).
33. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 On The Protection
Of Individuals With Regard To The Processing Of Personal Data And The Free
Movement Of Such Data, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 [hereinafter Privacy
Directive] (stating the purpose of the Directive is to regulate member states so that
they will “protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in
particular, their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data”).
Pursuant to the Privacy Directive, an individual must be given notice when personal
data is proposed to be processed by another party, including processing that results
in a dissemination of the data to another party. See id. at 42. The Privacy Directive
allows the individual to control the use of personal data by giving him the right to
object to and prevent the processing or dissemination of his personal data. See id. at
39. The Privacy Directive, however, also contemplates that an individual may be able
to foresee the dissemination of data and that he may desire the dissemination of
data. In such circumstances, the Privacy Directive allows the individual to consent to
such processing or dissemination in advance. See id. at 39-41. Exchange rules are
one potential means of providing consent.
34. See Office of International Affairs, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Futures Exchange and Contract Authorization, Standards and Procedures in Selected Countries
(Aug. 3, 1999) <http://cftc.gov/oia/marketcontracts.pdf> [hereinafter Standards and
Procedures in Selected Countries] (furnishing a summary report in table format of “the
results of a review of statutes and regulations of ten (10) jurisdictions in nine (9)
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In sum, these features of exchanges facilitate asset liquidity and the
reduction and isolation of credit risk, factors that usually are selfexecuting in the market. These features also serve to minimize
conflicts of interest and issues of interpretation that may develop
when bilateral contracts go awry.
B. Enhancing Legal Certainty—Could this Lead to a Race to the Top?
An exchange ordinarily must be authorized in the jurisdiction in
which it is domiciled,35 but it also may need approvals in other
jurisdictions in which the exchange, its members, or its participants
conduct business.36 To the extent that domestic law or the law of an
exchange’s “home” jurisdiction gives markets their legal identity and
shapes the manner in which they operate, concessions to or
reinforcements of the enforceability of market rules are important
elements of a mature jurisdiction’s capital markets law. In addition
to buttressing the exchange contract, such reinforcement can
increase the attractiveness of an exchange-type vehicle domiciled in
that location by increasing the likelihood that other jurisdictions will
recognize the “home” jurisdiction’s laws governing market rules,
thereby harmonizing jurisdictional differences.37
countries regarding (1) the authorization of exchanges; (2) the amendment of
exchange rules; (3) the admission of contracts to trading on an exchange; and
(4) the amendment of admitted contracts”). The CFTC recently adopted rules to
permit the listing of a futures contract on an exchange without prior notice to the
CFTC. See 64 Fed. Reg. 66,375 (1999). However, the CFTC retains supervision of
the contracts that are immediately listed—there must be a certification that the terms
and conditions meet CFTC guidance, the performance of the contract will be
overseen, and the market may opt to seek specific approval as opposed to immediate
listing. See CFTC Rule 5.3 (17 C.F.R. pt. 5, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,373 (1999)), available at
<http://www.cftc.gov/foia/fedreg99/991126a.pdf>.
35. See Standards and Procedures in Selected Countries, supra note 34 (instructing that
“jurisdictions require that exchanges be formally authorized by a regulatory
authority”).
36. Compare regarding French law, Article 18 of Law of 28 March 1885, as
amended, together with Decree 90-948, dated 25 October 1990 pursuant to which
such Law is enforced, with Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 On
Investment Services In The Securities Field, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, 33-34, as
amended at 1995 O.J. (L 168) 7 [hereinafter ISD] (governing conditions for taking up
business, including requirement for obtaining authorization from home member states’
competent authorities).
37. See Forum of European Securities Commissions, Standards for Regulated
Markets Under the ISD (Dec. 22, 1999) <www.europefesco.org>; see also Financial
Stability Forum, Report of the Task Force on Implementation of Standards (Mar. 15, 2000)
(visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.fsforum.org/Reports/RcplOS.html>.
The
Financial Stability Forum is an initiative of the Group of Seven countries and
describes itself as follows:
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was convened in April 1999 to promote
international financial stability through information exchange and
international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance. The
Forum brings together on a regular basis national authorities responsible for
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Market operators may choose the most hospitable jurisdiction,
from the perspective of its enabling law and infrastructure, in which
to domicile or to organize an electronic market, and will tailor
market rules to meet (or not be inconsistent with) the requirements
of jurisdictions from which they wish to be accessed.38 Such a choice
permits the market to reach the broadest possible customer base.
Theoretically, the choice of a jurisdiction that imposes the least
amount of regulation, or that has a minimal regulatory infrastructure,
would not occur.
Assuming that the more successful market jurisdictions have wellinformed participants and regulators or other market authorities that
address fraud, misinformation, and anti-competitive abuses, the effect
of choosing more successful market jurisdictions could result in a
“race to the top” rather than the alternative, which contemplates only
regulatory costs and not regulatory benefits in market jurisdiction
selection.39 This effect occurs because the rules and the manner in
financial stability in significant international financial centres, international
financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators
and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSF seeks to
co-ordinate the efforts of these various bodies in order to promote
international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and
reduce systemic risk.
Financial Stability Forum (last updated May 25, 2000) <http://www.fsforum.org/
Home.html>.
38. A regulatory authority in a jurisdiction from which financial intermediaries
access an electronic market in another jurisdiction may make its own determination
regarding whether the electronic market must be authorized in its jurisdiction to
provide services there. But, in making this determination, such regulatory authority
is likely to take into account the quality of the regulatory system of the jurisdiction in
which the electronic market is established and regulated and, likewise, it will
consider the internal operating rules of the electronic market. Compare IOSCO
Technical Committee, Principles for the Oversight of Screen-Based Trading Systems, supra
note 22 (suggesting that all relevant regulatory authorities should assess a system’s
compliance with the Principles).
39. Much has been written over time about the fear of a “race to the bottom” and
“regulatory arbitrage.” It is true that users of markets may seek to reduce agency
costs by choosing a particular method or place for transacting. Informal surveys
generally identify liquidity as the primary goal of market users. But there is some
evidence that users increasingly evaluate the transparency of rules and the strength
of the market infrastructure. According to a November 1999 report by the Division
of Economic analysis of the CFTC, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FUTURES
MARKETS REVISITED: “As the trading statistics reviewed above demonstrate, there is a
lack of solid evidence supporting the notion that disparities in regulatory schemes
are having significant effects on the U.S. competitive position.” DIV. OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, CFTC, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FUTURES MARKETS REVISITED
36 (1999) [hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS]. In the United States, recent
initiatives of the SEC and the CFTC are intended to permit the election of higher
regulation for its benefits. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c 3-1, Appendix F – Optional Market
and Credit Risk Requirements for OTC Derivatives Dealers, and the CFTC’s
Proposed New Regulatory Framework (Feb. 2000) (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/reports.htm>; see also Forum of European Securities
Commissions, Consultation Paper on Implementation of Article 11 of the ISD: Categorization
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which the rules control risk and the integrity of the transaction are
part of the product being sold over the system. Choosing a
jurisdiction with too low a regulatory level within which to frame the
rules could compromise their enforceability, unduly limit the class of
participants that would be able to trade on the system, or reduce the
geographic scope of the market’s business. Of course, market
participants would take other factors into account in choosing a
domicile, such as the most likely location of the bulk of the targeted
customer base, the time zone coverage, the nature of the contract
traded, the location where banking or delivery arrangements, if any,
are likely to be located, the nature of the products on which
reference prices are based, and whether the trade requires physical
delivery rather than a cash settlement.
Interestingly, some jurisdictions have proactively adopted
legislation or given judicial recognition that market rules will
supersede certain contravening local laws.
For example, the
European Union (“EU”) has adopted a directive that requires
Member States to transpose into their national law certain provisions
that will cause the rules of a securities settlement system to govern
transactions on the system in lieu of, or with precedence over,
conflicting national bankruptcy law provisions.40
C. Other Strategies to Achieve Legal Certainty Across Borders
Given that a major benefit of electronic markets is their ability to
of Investors for the Purpose of Conduct of Business Rules, at ¶ 11 (November 1999) (visited
June 26, 2000) <http://www.europefesco.org> (suggesting that professional investors
should be permitted to request non-professional treatment, i.e. to opt for a higher
level of protection). As mentioned above, the international standard-setting bodies,
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision have conducted a standard-setting exercise intended to
specify a set of core international standards applicable to investment services
providers, including secondary markets and credit institutions, and have commenced
an exercise that is ongoing to assess (or to cooperate in assessments conducted by
the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank) implementation of those principles by national jurisdictions. See
Financial Stability Forum, supra note 37. This author has been advised that an initial
step in implementing the Euronext platform providing a single facility for executing
trades in Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam securities markets will be a comprehensive
exercise to harmonize the relevant component market rules. See infra note 67.
40. See Settlement Finality Directive, supra note 29, §§ 6-8 (discussing “Provisions
Concerning Insolvency Proceedings” including the requirement that “[i]n the event
of insolvency proceedings being opened against a participant in a system, the rights
and obligations arising from, or in connection with, the participation of that
participant shall be determined by the law governing that system”); and § 9
(providing that “[t]he rights of a participant to collateral security provided to it in
connection with a system . . . shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings against
[a] participant. . . .Such collateral security may be realised for the satisfaction of
these rights”).
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link users located in multiple dispersed jurisdictions, the question
remains whether international differences can reliably be bridged
based solely on the assurance that the home or domicile of a market
is conducive to enforcement of that market’s rules? Alternatively,
there may be other measures, in addition to assurances of market
rule enforceability, on which market participants might rely to
acquire confidence in the precise functioning of the market for
remote or offshore users. In fact, as discussed below, market
regulators—like markets—also have developed four innovative
approaches to surmounting the lack of international protocols or
rules to resolve jurisdictional differences. In doing so, they too have
found that, although a clear international set of parameters would be
desirable, the evolutionary state of international law need not
necessarily be an obstacle to regulatory arrangements intended (1) to
enhance the enforcement of exchange rules, (2) to facilitate crossborder access to markets, and (3) to deliver needed customer
protections.41
1.

Follow the money
The first approach is similar to the approach followed by all other
sophisticated participants in financial markets: regulators can follow
the money. The market system can require the money (margin) to
41.See, e.g., IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, pt. I.4, (Sept. 1998)
(visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-objectives.html>
(stating the three core objectives of securities regulation: “the protection of
investors; [e]nsuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent; [and t]he
reduction of systemic risk”); see also Declaration on Cooperation and Supervision of
International Futures Markets and Clearing Organisations § 1.5 (last amended Mar. 1998)
<http://www.cftc.gov/oia/bocadec0398.htm> [hereinafter Boca Declaration] (stating
a declaration of intent, supported by 27 regulatory authorities, “desiring generally to
promote the sharing of information necessary to strengthen regulatory supervision,
minimize systemic risk, prevent or limit potential abusive or manipulative practices
and enhance customer and investor protection, the Authorities hereby intend, by use
of the most appropriate lawful means at their disposal, to seek and assist
parties . . . .”). Such arrangements may be further supported by practitioner
agreement on best practices. See, e.g., The Recommendations of the Global Task
Force on Financial Integrity of the Futures Industry Association (visited June 26,
2000) <http://www.fiafii.org/content/ beta.asp?t=a>; see also Tokyo Communiqué on
Supervision of Commodity Futures Markets (Oct. 1997) (issued by representatives of the
regulatory authorities of 16 jurisdictions responsible for the supervision of commodity
futures markets following a conference in Tokyo, Japan); IOSCO Technical Committee,
Application of the Tokyo Communiqué to Exchange Traded Derivative Contracts (Dec. 1998)
(visited
June
7,
2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/docs-public/1998-exchange_
traded_derivatives-document01.html> [hereinafter Tokyo Communiqué]; SUBCOMMITEE
ON THE LONDON COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF IOSCO, LONDON
COMMUNIQUÉ PROJECT, RESPONSE TO THE SURVEY OF OPINION REGARDING ‘BEST
PRACTICES’ FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF COMMODITY CONTRACTS AND SURVEILLANCE OF
COMMODITY MARKETS AND OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) COMMODITY FUTURES ACTIVITY
(‘MARKET SURVEILLANCE’) (May 30, 1997) (on file with American University Law Review).
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be located (and electronic means may further facilitate this) where
enforcement of the market rules relating to the money’s disposition
are most likely assured. Indeed, systems can be designed where the
system itself debits or credits a trading account based on linkages to
banking facilities, thereby limiting, if not eliminating entirely in the
case of cash-settled contracts, the time between conclusion of a trade
and payment or settlement and the incumbent credit risk.42
2.

Develop informal regulatory alliances or allocations of regulatory
emphasis
Second, just as markets can form alliances,43 so too can regulators.44
Regulators may be able to further harmonize or assure the
42. For example, U.S. exchanges clearing delivery rules involve arrangements
with banks in the jurisdiction of the currency traded or used for settlement. But
conceptually, a fund of customer accounts used for settlement could permit multicurrency settlement within the account, subject to a mechanism for handling
imbalances. For example, FutureCom, an internet-based exchange designated as a
contract market by the CFTC, Release #4378-00 (Mar. 14, 2000), provides for
integrated clearing whereby each customer participant has its own individual
clearing and margin account with the market. See Commodity Futures Exchange
Commission Release No. 4378-00 (Mar. 14, 2000), available at CFTC, Release #4378-00
(visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press00/4378-00.htm>.
43. See, e.g., infra notes 45, 48 (citing CME News Center and CME Trader’s
Corner materials referencing agreements between exchanges in Chicago, London,
France and Singapore); Chicago Mercantile Exchange:
Traders Corner,
CME/SIMEX Mutual Offset System, The Worlds Most Successful Trading Link (visited June
7, 2000) <http://www.cme. com/market/interest/mos.html> (referring to the CME
partnership with the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) that
pioneered the Mutual Offset approach to futures clearing); Corcoran, supra note 19,
at 145; see also Chicago Mercantile Exchange: News Center, Chicago MERC Established
Landmark Links with 2 European Exchanges: Agreements Pave Way for MERC in European
Monetary Union (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cme.com/news/emulink.html>
[hereinafter CME News Center] (discussing information-sharing arrangements in
connection with the links established through the agreements between CME,
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (“LIFFE”) and
Marchè á Terme International de France (“MATIF”)); infra note 66 (describing
European exchange alliances).
44. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The CFTC: An Active
Partner in Global Cooperation Through Information-Sharing with Other Financial Regulators
(Apr. 28, 1999) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/background/mou.html> [hereinafter
CFTC Backgrounder] (reflecting the CFTC’s ability as a regulatory body to form
alliances); Memorandum from the Division of Trading and Markets on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange’s Proposed New rule 575 and Cross-Exchange Access Program
(Sept. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Cross-Access] (approving the proposed rule and CrossAccess Program with the Marché à Terme International de France, which specifies or
allocates responsibilities between the markets subject to regulation for oversight of
trading using Globex) (available from the Secretariat of the Commission); see also
Coordination, Reporting and Publication of International Agreements, 22 C.F.R. pt.
181 (1999) (regulating coordination, reporting, and publication of international
agreements); Department of State procedures set out in Volume 11, Foreign Affairs
Manual, Chapter 700 (1985), available at <http://foia.state.gov/Famdir/
MasterDocs/11fam/ 11m0720.doc> [hereinafter Circular 175 Procedure]; Boca
Declaration and Tokyo Communiqué, supra note 41.
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effectiveness of market rules in remote jurisdictions by promoting
joint ventures, alliances, or memoranda of understanding that
function in a manner similar to a type of contract among the affected
regulatory authorities.45 For such arrangements to be binding under
international law, they may have to be negotiated among the relevant
governmental authorities, subject to a potentially cumbersome
foreign policy or treaty process.46 Regulators, however, are free to
adopt a statement of intention that is further supported by the
operating rules of the market.47 For example, regulatory authorities
can indicate that there is an understanding among them to share
oversight, supervisory information, and compliance responsibility
under arrangements that take account of which regulator is best
placed (by location or powers) to assume the responsibility, without
invoking procedures relevant to concluding legal assistance treaties.48
To date, this type of arrangement by regulators has been the vehicle
of choice to address regulatory concerns arising from the increasing
international scope of markets. The very fact that such smart
strategies for overcoming a gap in international law can be, and in
fact are, effective suggests that the practicability of these
arrangements should be further explored by market developers and
market regulators.
3.

Promote basic, high-level ground-rules
A third possibility would be to encourage the relevant regional or

45. The CFTC Backgrounder describes information-sharing through Memoranda
of Understanding. See CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 44, at 44 (listing countries with
which the CFTC has entered into formal and informal arrangements for cross-border
information-sharing and assisting foreign authorities with various surveillance and
enforcement issues).
46. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 610-16 (5th ed.
1998) (discussing the treaty-making process).
47. See generally Commodity and Exchange Act § 12(a), 7 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998) (defining CFTC operations and permitting cooperation with any
foreign futures authority); see also Circular 175 Procedure, supra note 44.
48. See Status Report on Exchange-Traded Derivatives Markets in Emerging and
Developing Countries (Aug. 1997) (listing Memorandums of Understanding
(“MOU’s”) by country) (visited June 14, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/oia/
interpro.htm/InternationalPublications>; see also Boca Declaration, supra note 41,
§ 1.3-1.4 (endorsing MOU’s among futures exchanges and clearing organizations “to
facilitate and strengthen sharing of relevant information . . . [and] to improve
cooperation” among the parties with “respect to potential hazards to stability, safety
and soundness of the international financial markets,” and providing a mechanism
whereby regulators can assist markets to share information with each other); see also
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Release No. 4391-00 (Apr. 6, 2000),
available at Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Release #4391-00
(visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press00/4391-00.htm>; CFTC
Backgrounder, supra note 44 (describing the CFTC’s cooperation with regulatory and
enforcement authorities through MOU’s); Cross-Access, supra note 44.
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international organization of market regulators, such as IOSCO, to
develop some basic, high level ground-rules to which all participating
countries generally would subscribe. The IOSCO Principles for the
Oversight of Screen-Based Trading Systems for Derivative Products,49
adopted in 1990, were developed for just this reason. IOSCO is the
premier organization of securities and derivatives regulators; that is, it
is the international standard setter for market regulators.50 It has
ninety-seven ordinary (securities commission) members and a total
membership of 164,51 which includes international financial
institutions (such as the World Bank), self-regulatory associations,
and trade associations, as well as additional national governmental
authorities with an interest in the development of appropriate
infrastructure for financial markets.52
The story behind the story of the development of the IOSCO
Principles for the Oversight of Screen-based Trading Systems for
Derivative Products is as follows: Developers of Globex, a planned,
around-the-clock, around-the-globe trading system designed by the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and Reuters in the 1980s, wanted
49. See IOSCO Technical Committee, Principles for the Oversight of Screen-Based
Trading Systems, at Documents Library, (June 1990) (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html> (adopting 10 principles that addressed areas of
common regulatory concern). These principles are currently subject to a project to
update and review their applicability to cross border contexts being conducted by
Working Party 2 of the Technical Committee of IOSCO. See supra note 41; Financial
Stability Forum Releases Grouping of Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) to Assist in
Setting Priorities for Assessment (May 26, 2000) (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.fsforum.org/Press/ Home.html> (promoting movement to agreed
international standards).
50. IOSCO is an organization composed of national and international member
agencies that have resolved:
(1) to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulations in order
to maintain just, efficient and sound markets;
(2) to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to
promote the development of domestic markets;
(3) to unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance
of international securities transactions; and
(4) to provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a
rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against
offenses.
IOSCO,
General
Information
on
IOSCO
(visited
June
7,
2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/gen-info_main.html>
[hereinafter
IOSCO
General
Information].
51. See IOSCO, IOSCO Membership Lists (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html> (linking user to lists of ordinary members,
associate members, and affiliate members).
52. See IOSCO General Information, supra note 50, at Applications for Membership
(stating that securities commissions or similar government bodies are eligible for
ordinary membership; national associations that consist of public regulatory bodies
are eligible for associate membership, provided that a national regulatory body of
the same country is an ordinary member; and self-regulating organizations (“SRO”)
or international bodies are eligible for affiliate membership).
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international guidance in advance regarding the types of
requirements that might be applied to placement of its computer
trading screens in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Developers of Globex also
wanted guidance on what would be the likely level of national
regulatory interest in the major market jurisdictions in which they
hoped to enter trading alliances, with respect to oversight of trading
through such screens. At the same time, regulators wanted some
guidance to assist them in addressing this proposal, then on the
cutting edge of innovation. Indeed, at that time, there were very few,
if any, rules governing screen access. Members of IOSCO’s Technical
Committee were seeking some international consensus on what level
of national scrutiny for the market systems seeking to establish
themselves by the placement of terminals or electronic access
arrangements in multiple jurisdictions would not be protectionist or
inappropriate.
The EU, in the Investment Services Directive (“ISD”),53 addressed
the issue of the cross-border access to markets and provision of
services in the context of an economically integrating, supranational
community of nation-states—a sui generis type of regional
confederation—where services may be provided freely across borders.
The EU balanced competing regulatory and other interests in favor
of letting screen-based markets provide screen access to financial
intermediaries operating anywhere within the EU under the basic
home/host framework for allocating jurisdiction over the provision
of financial services within the community.54 The ISD provides a solid
regulatory foundation for such an approach because it harmonizes
certain major concepts relating to financial services regulation.55 In
the United States, both the SEC and the CFTC are examining issues
related to screen-based markets. In the negotiation of the Agreement
on the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, the contracting states favored open access
regarding financial services, subject only to prudential and
comparability reservations.56
53. See ISD, supra note 36 (concerning investment services relating to securities
which for purposes of the ISD include financial derivatives).
54. See id. at 38-39 (regulating home/host framework in Article 15).
55. See id. at 27 (justifying adoption of the Directive because of the “essential
harmonization necessary and sufficient to secure mutual recognition of
authorization and of prudential supervision systems” in the field of financial
services). For example, Article 15 of the Directive governs requirements relating to
membership in or access to regulated markets and their corresponding clearing systems
in a “host” EU Member State by investment firms authorized in another “home” EU
Member State. See id. at 38-39.
56. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Financial Services,
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4.

Reinforce certainty by multilateral agreement
Fourth, as a practical matter, it appears much more difficult for a
court to set aside a multilateral agreement among many users than a
contract negotiated between two parties. This is especially true in
cases in which exchange operating rules and contracts are
agreements or sets of rules that have the imprimatur of the relevant
regulator in the home jurisdiction and also meet certain parameters
in the host jurisdiction.57 It is not so easy for a judicial authority to
determine, to disregard, set aside, or reinterpret the contract (and
hence the expectations) of all the parties in such a case.
Additionally, the symmetry of information access and the identity of
trading rules incorporated in the trading system design prevents
arguments as to asymmetry of information. Such arguments could be
the basis for setting aside bilateral agreements on grounds of unequal
access to information or unequal bargaining power if due to
unforeseen price moves or other circumstances such agreements
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). See generally World Trade
Organization (last updated May 31, 2000) <http://www.wto.org> (providing World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) information and resources).
57. The CFTC Division of Trading and Markets has issued no-action letters
regarding the placement of terminals in the United States to access foreign screenbased trading systems to London International Financial Futures Exchange; Eurex
Deutschland; Parisbourse SBF SA; and to Sydney Futures Exchange Limited/New
Zealand Futures and Options Exchange Limited (“SFE/NZFOE”); The International
Petroleum Exchange of London Limited; and the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange Limited. See LIFFE Admin. and Mgmt., CFTC No-Action Letter (July 23,
1999) (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/liffe%20noaction.htm>; Eurex Deutschland, CFTC No-Action Letter (Aug. 10, 1999) (visited
June
21,
2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/eurex%20noaction.htm>; Parisbourse SBF SA, CFTC No-Action Letter (Aug. 10, 1999) (visited
June
7,
2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/parisbourse.htm>;
SFE/N2FOE, CFTC No-Action Letter (Aug. 10, 1999) (visited June 21, 2000)
<http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/sycom%20no-action.htm>;
The
International Petroleum Exchange of London Limited (Nov. 12, 1999) (visited June
13, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/ipenoaction.htm>; Singapore
International Monetary Exchange Limited, CFTC No-Action Letter (Dec. 17, 1999)
(visited June 13, 2000) <http://www.cftc.gov/tm/letters/99letters/99-63.htm). In
issuing such no-action letters, the Division noted, among other things, that such
exchanges are authorized under the laws of another country; the market members
are subject to oversight in the other country by a legitimate regulatory authority that
is responsible for ensuring their compliance with an extensive regulatory regime; the
market adheres to the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation; and
the U.S. and foreign regulatory authority are parties to information-sharing
arrangements applicable to the activities of the market. For historical background,
see Access to Automated Boards of Trade, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,159 (1999) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 30), CFTC Order withdrawing such proposed rules dated June 2,
1999, and CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 44, which states that the CFTC enters into
Memoranda of Understanding with foreign regulatory and enforcement agencies as
a way to promote the sharing of information, which can be “critical in combating
cross-border fraud and manipulation, addressing the financial risks of market
participants, and sharing regulatory expertise on market oversight and supervision.”
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prove to be unduly onerous.58
II. CURRENT INITIATIVES APPLYING THE ELECTRONIC EXCHANGE
STRUCTURE TO ACHIEVE GLOBAL SCOPE
These would be merely theoretical musings as to the possible uses
of a market format if there were no evidence that practitioners or
regulatory authorities believe that “marketization” of financial
instruments can have distinct advantages in this age of electronic
globalization. Therefore, there follow three examples of current or
projected initiatives that seek to exploit the synthetic governmental
elements of exchanges:
(1) The London Clearing House’s
SwapClear program (“SwapClear”), a program for clearing OTC
transactions; (2) BrokerTec Global, LLC (“BrokerTec”), a proposal
to link various cash fixed-income and derivatives markets across
borders through a common trading platform; and (3) the Kyoto
Protocol, a proposal for emissions trading. These initiatives use a
market framework (and, in particular, the market’s capacity to
unbundle clearing, execution, and strategic services electronically) to
resolve international differences in regulation.
A. SwapClear
SwapClear is a program for clearing OTC transactions together
with exchange-traded contracts through the London Clearing House
(“LCH”) in accordance with applicable clearing rules and procedures
intended to permit a broader netting between types of products than
otherwise would be achievable in most jurisdictions.59 The program is
promoted as a means to improve risk management of such contracts
and to reduce legal uncertainty.60 The clearing program is currently
based in London, although clearing members need not necessarily be
London-based. The rules of the clearing arrangements permit
registered OTC contracts meeting certain specifications to be offset
against exchange business and cash flows within the clearing system.61
58. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 128687 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (discussing symmetry of information access in concluding that
the plaintiff used its own independent knowledge of the market in forming its
expectations).
59. See CFTC Release 4247-99, supra note 5 (announcing the CFTC Order
exempting SwapClear from most provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act).
60. See id. (citing former CFTC Chairperson Brooksley Born characterizing
SwapClear as “a significant step toward protecting dealers in the over-the-counter
derivatives market from counterparty credit risk”).
61. See id. (regarding CFTC’s order confirming certain swap agreements
submitted for clearing through SwapClear would remain exempt from most
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act); see also OTC Survey, supra note 15, at 1,
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These arrangements are supported by national and EU legislation
intended to assure the desired treatment of, as well as to assure
desired legal opinions relating to the rights and obligations of
counterparties based in various jurisdictions.62 Contracts, wherever
initiated, meeting SwapClear specifications should be capable of
being cleared, provided that they do not infringe upon relevant local
law.
The CFTC facilitated the use of these clearing arrangements by
persons in the United States by removing any ambiguity as to the
likelihood that the CFTC would take the position that U.S.
counterparties, using the system to clear OTC business, would lose
the protection of exemptions from the Commodity Exchange Act.63
The LCH program takes advantage of applicable law (and also
various legal opinions) that allows business combined and cleared
through SwapClear to be protected from certain uncertainties and
limitations that may afflict the use of master netting agreements
because of variations in international insolvency law.64
39-41 (furnishing survey results on which jurisdictions have clearing facilities for
OTC transactions); President’s Working Group on Financial Matters, Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, at 18-21 (Nov. 1999) (Electronic
Trading Systems and Clearing Systems).
62. See Settlement Finality Directive, supra note 29, at 45-46 (discussing basis for
the Directive and importance of reducing risks associated with participation in
securities settlement systems as a way to assure desired treatment of participants); see
also OTC Survey, supra note 15, at 69-70 (reviewing insolvency law with respect to OTC
transactions and, specifically, the extension of market insolvency protections to
cleared OTC derivative transactions in the United Kingdom).
63. See CFTC Release 4247-99 (announcing the CFTC’s order exempting
SwapClear); see also Exemption of Swap Agreements, 17 C.F.R. pt. 35 (1999)
(regarding the exemption of qualifying swap agreements from certain provisions of
the Commodity Exchange Act).
64. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Settlement Finality
Directive’s insolvency provisions). For information regarding International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) documentation and legislation projects
regarding the enforceability of netting and collateral arrangements, see
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA Documentation: Current ISDA
Documentation Projects (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.isda.org/c2.html> (naming
documentation projects, furnishing status and projected completion of the projects);
ISDA, ISDA Documentation: Status of Netting Opinions (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.isda.org/c4.html> (listing status of netting opinions by country and
counsel); ISDA, ISDA Documentation: Status of Netting Legislation (visited June 7, 2000)
<http://www.isda.org/c6.html> (furnishing status of adoption of netting legislation
by country as “adopted” or as “under consideration”); ISDA, ISDA Documentation:
Status of Collateral Opinions (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.isda.org/c8.html>
(listing status of completion of collateral opinions by country and counsel as
“completed” or as “pending”); see also Council Directive 96/10/EC of 21 March 1996
As Regards Recognition Of Contractual Netting By The Competent Authorities, 1996
O.J. (L 85) 17-21 [hereinafter Netting Directive] (permitting credit institutions to
calculate their “own funds” (capital) on the basis of a net rather than a gross amount
with respect to contracts that are subject to an enforceable bilateral netting
arrangement). The Netting Directive requires that, to take advantage of the
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B. BrokerTec, Global LLC
BrokerTec is a proposal that circulated during the summer of 1999
to a number of brokers and markets by a group of co-venturers from
the cash and derivatives foreign-exchange industry.65 That proposal
sets out global clearing and execution objectives that the proponents
believe can be met through establishing a single platform to access
listed derivatives in multiple markets. The proposal would add to an
inter-dealer cash brokerage arrangement the ability to crosscollateralize and potentially net cash flows with respect to futures
related products. The proposal contemplates a fully international
facility. The basic elements of the desired arrangements were
outlined to a number of exchanges and dealers who could be
potential co-venturers and who could have input into the design of
the structure and governance of the project. The visionary theme of
the project is to develop an electronic pan-global marketplace that
improves the security, transparency, and integrity of transactions
using a market format. Several combinations of exchanges within the
EU are proposing similar plans for common pan-European platforms
for trading and/or clearing.66
Directive, the credit institution must have an opinion of counsel that the operative
netting arrangements are enforceable in the pertinent jurisdictions. See Netting
Directive, supra, at Annex II, Article 3(a)(i)-(ii) (displaying conditions for
recognition of contractual netting arrangement).
65. See Statement by BrokerTec Global, LLC, supra note 6.
66. For example, during 1999 and early 2000, international press reported the
following initiatives:
eight of the principal European exchanges (those in
Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Milan, Paris, and Zürich) recently
signed an accord to form a European alliance with the long-term objective of
creating a single common electronic platform with common rules. The ultimate
objective of this accord was to build a unified pan-European market; however, this
accord may not go forward. The regulated French markets, SBF, Matif S.A., Monep
S.A. and Societe de Nouveau Marché recently merged to form ParisBourse SBF SA,
bringing together all trading in equities, derivative products, and commodities, with
each market maintaining its own regulations, identity, and members. Clearing for
these markets was to take place through a separate entity, the Banque Centrale de
Compensation, or Clearnet SBF SA, which ultimately proposes to provide panEuropean clearing similar to that provided by the National Securities Clearing
Corporation/Government Securities Clearing Corporation in the United States. The
OM Stockholm Exchange and the Copenhagen Stock Exchange have commenced
equity trading via a single electronic system using common trading rules. Seventy
percent of the total equity market of the Nordic countries as a result was reported as
accessible from this single system. See Amsterdam Exchanges, Amsterdam, Brussels and
Paris Merge to Create the Leading European Exchange (Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://www.bourse-de-paris.fr/en/news7/fsg770.htm> (announcing that the
Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris exchanges will merge into Euronext). Euronext will
continue to pursue the goal of a pan-European trading infrastructure and to
maintain existing alliances of each of the former exchanges. See id. The London
Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse also recently announced a proposed merger to
form “iX,” on which equities will be traded. See <http://www.exchange.de/cgi-bin/
hframez.exe?FS@/INTERNET/EXCHANGE/home/topbar_e.htm@/INTERNET/E
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C. The Kyoto Protocol
A third proposal, the Kyoto Protocol, memorializes the
international objective of reducing greenhouse gasses (global carbon
emissions) in the interest of protecting climatic conditions and the
corresponding or related environmental benefits.67 The Protocol
anticipates the design of an emission trading program that would
permit trading of surpluses or deficits in overall caps or limits across
borders either by sovereign jurisdictions directly or domestically in
the first instance and then internationally in the second instance.68
The Protocol’s expectation of using trading as a means of achieving
the agreed-upon country goals of reducing particular emission levels
is modeled on the highly successful SO2 (acid rain) trading program
in the United States, a cash market auction handled by the Chicago
Board of Trade (“CBOT”). The program reportedly has contributed
to implementation of current reduced levels at substantially reduced
economic costs (about fifty percent) to those originally estimated.
To develop a trading program, a unit of trading would have to be
identified; standardized tradable units, which legally can convey the
interest, would have to be created; and verification, tracking and
enforcement of subsequent use (expenditure or banking) of the
XCHANGE/fusion/sidebar_fusion_e.htm@/INTERNET/EXCHANGE/fusion/main
_fusion_e.htm> (visited May 24, 2000).
67. For the full text of the Kyoto Protocol, see The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Control (“UNFCC”), The Convention and Kyoto Protocol (last
modified June 5, 2000) <http://www.unfccc.de/resource/convkp.html>, which
provides the status of signatories to the Kyoto Protocol and links to the Introduction
and the full text of the Protocol and UNFCC, Home (last modified June 6, 2000)
<http://www.unfcc.de/index.html>, which provides ability to search UNFCC
websites for information regarding the “Kyoto Protocol,” including information
provided through a myriad of sources such as technical workshops, status of
ratification summaries, press releases, secretariat resource sessions, documents of the
conference of the parties, documents of subsidiary parties, official documents, and
daily programs. See generally United States Environmental Protection Agency, The
Kyoto Protocol and the President’s Policies to Address Climate Change (July 1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppeoee1/globalwarming/publications/actions/wh_kyoto/in
dex.html> (analyzing the costs and benefits of complying with the Kyoto Protocol’s
emissions reduction target for the United States and concluding that the United
States can reach its Kyoto target at a relatively modest cost because of the flexibility
mechanisms included in the treaty and by pursuing sound domestic policies); see also
generally United States Environmental Protection Agency, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change
(Jan.
15,
1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/oppeoee1/globalwarming/
publications/actions/us_position/98_kyotofact.html> [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]
(publishing a fact sheet released by the Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, that provides facts regarding the
Kyoto Protocol, including data relating to background information, emissions
targets, international emissions trading, joint implementation among developed
countries, clean development mechanisms, developing countries, military emissions,
and compliance, enforcement and entry into force).
68. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, at International Emissions Trading.
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interest would be required.69 Assuming the cash instrument can be
created, and the monitoring and scientific measurement issues
resolved, developing a market that operates internationally should be
possible using the force of contract law consistent with the principles
and examples set forth above.70
In this case, any
international/supranational entity created to facilitate trading may
receive legal or regulatory support from or in participating countries.
CONCLUSION
Private regulation of markets through rules places a premium on
enforceability of contracts evidenced by market rules, particularly
those related to the creation of tradable interests and to the
protection under the exchange rules of enforcement of financial
settlements embedded in the traded instrument. Markets arguably
cannot flourish in environments where rules are applied disparately,
where the governance of the market or of the jurisdiction where the
market is located is suspect, or where money paid to the market
could be diverted.71 To the extent an electronic system makes trading
69. Richard Sandor, a student of the history of markets, is responsible for
“inventing” a number of new markets. He has noted:
a simple seven-stage process for market development: 1. a structural
economic change that creates a demand for new services; 2. the creation of
uniform standards for a commodity or security; 3. the development of a legal
instrument which provides evidence of ownership; 4. the development of
informal spot markets (for immediate delivery) and forward markets (nonstandardized agreements for future delivery) in commodities and securities
where “receipts” of ownership are traded; 5. the emergence of securities and
commodities exchanges; 6. the creation of organized futures markets
(standardized contracts for future delivery on organized exchanges) and
options markets (rights but not guarantees for future delivery) in
commodities and securities; and 7. the proliferation of over-the-counter
markets.
Richard L. Sandor & Jerry R. Skees, Creating a Market for Carbon Emissions:
Opportunities for U.S. Farmers, CHOICES, First Quarter 1999, at 13, available at
<http://www.envifi.com/Internal/Choices.htm>.
70. For further discussion, see European Comm’n, COM(2000)87, Green Paper
on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union (2000), and the
associated background documents: Studies on Climate Change; Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development Final Report: Designing Options
for Implementing an Emissions Trading Regime for Greenhouse Gases in the EC (2000) and
Center for Clean Air Policy Working Paper: Design of a Practical Approach to Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading Combined with Policies and Measures in the EC (1999) (visited June
26,
2000)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/docum/0087_en.htm>
(initiating public discussion on the possible organization of a cash market in
greenhouse gas emission permits within the EU).
71. See Corcoran, supra note 10 (discussing uncertainty about equitable
application of laws, clearing arrangements, ability to repatriate funds, enforceability
of obligations, and prices of underlying reference products as major impediments to
successful market structures); see also THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE
ON COMMODITY RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 9 (advocating the use of market-based
solutions to address commodity price volatility in certain developing countries).
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system rules self-enforcing or embedded in the system and related
settlement systems collect the money to secure market risk up-front,
the potential for rule infractions, contractual breaches, or failures of
the market to operate as intended is reduced.
With the foregoing caveats, markets potentially can harmonize
requirements across borders where legislatures have failed (or have
yet) to do so, and can provide internationally-ruled trading facilities
notwithstanding the national nature of financial services law.
As detailed in this Article, increasingly, electronic markets are
being created to monetize various rights and interests and to render
them pricable and tradable. Also, increasingly, both traditional and
new markets are interlinked electronically by common platforms
serving products traded in more than one jurisdiction, by aggregation
of components, such as execution and clearing facilities located in
different jurisdictions, and by participants located in different
jurisdictions. These developments, driven by changes in technology
and by regional economic integration, particularly in Europe, have
created increasing pressure for clarity as to applicable law defining
the rights and interests of market participants.
This Article submits that the natural legal structure of derivatives
markets provides one mechanism for providing clarity as to those
rights and interests notwithstanding that the markets span several
jurisdictions and are otherwise global in scope. Specifically, the
market structure creates the property interest traded, provides the
rules for transfer of that interest and transfer of funds reflecting gains
and losses in that interest, and rules establishing the rights and
interests of all relevant parties in the event of default. This is true
whether or not enforcement of the market rules or contracts is
undertaken by the market itself, outsourced to another authority, or
enforced directly by the regulator. The choice of law embedded in
this structure can, therefore, under general rules of international law,
especially with reinforcement from related international law,
promote both the harmonization of rules across jurisdictions and
clarity as to the applicable law of the transaction and the property
interest and other rights and interests related to the transaction. This
aspect of markets deserves to be further explored and exploited in
the face of burgeoning globalization.
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APPENDIX
IOSCO PRINCIPLES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF SCREEN-BASED TRADING
SYSTEMS FOR DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS REPORT OF THE IOSCO
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, JUNE 1990
1. The system sponsor should be able to demonstrate to the
relevant regulatory authorities that the system meets and continues to
meet applicable legal standards, regulatory policies, and/or market
custom or practice where relevant.
2. The system should be designed to ensure the equitable
availability of accurate and timely trade and quotation information to
all system participants and the system sponsor should be able to
describe to the relevant regulatory authorities the processing,
prioritization, and display of quotations within the system.
3. The system sponsor should be able to describe to the relevant
regulatory authorities the order execution algorithm used by the
system, i.e., the set of rules governing the processing, including
prioritization and execution, of orders.
4. From a technical perspective, the system should be designed to
operate in a manner which is equitable to all market participants and
any differences in treatment among classes of participants should be
identified.
5. Before implementation, and on a periodic basis thereafter, the
system and system interfaces should be subject to an objective risk
assessment to identify vulnerabilities (e.g., the risk of unauthorized
access, internal failures, human errors, attacks, and natural
catastrophes) which may exist in the system design, development, or
implementation.
6. Procedures should be established to ensure the competence,
integrity, and authority of system users, to ensure that system users
are adequately supervised, and that access to the system is not
arbitrarily or discriminatorily denied.
7. The relevant regulatory authorities and the system sponsor
should consider any additional risk management exposures pertinent
to the system, including those arising from interaction with related
financial systems.
8. Mechanisms should be in place to ensure that the information
necessary to conduct adequate surveillance of the system for
supervisory and enforcement purposes is available to the system
sponsor and the relevant regulatory authorities on a timely basis.
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9. The relevant regulatory authorities and/or the system sponsor
should ensure that the system users and system customers are
adequately informed of the significant risks particular to trading
through the system. The liability of the system sponsor, and/or the
system providers to system users and system customers should be
described, especially any agreements that seek to vary allocation of
losses that otherwise would result by operation of law.
10. Procedures should be developed to ensure that the system
sponsor, system providers, and system users are aware of and will be
responsive to the directives and concerns of the relevant regulatory
authorities.

